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CALIFORNIA-IN SEARCH OF A SOLUTION
FOR EXCESS LIABILITY PROBLEMS
The typical liability insurance policy reserves to the insurer the
sole right of settlement.' Under certain circumstances an insurer may
be held liable to its insured for its failure to settle.2 If a claimant
offers to settle within policy limits and the insurer rejects the offer
and the judgment at trial is in excess of the policy limits, the stage
is set for an excess liability suit.
That the policyholder may have a cause of action for failure
to settle in the above situation is accepted by most jurisdictions
today.' These courts recognize that the insurer, by reserving the
right to accept or reject settlement, can adversely affect the interests
of its insured; a decision by the insurer not to settle within policy
limits comes into conflict with the insured's natural desire to settle
and avoid the risk of a judgment in excess of the policy limits.4 The
courts believe that the insurance carrier's power to control settle-
ment and thereby affect the interests of its policyholder should be
coupled with responsibility for its exercise.5
There is some disagreement among the jurisdictions recognizing
the cause of action as to whether the theory of the insurer's liability
is founded upon contract or tort. The majority of these jurisdictions
understand an insurer's liability to lie in tort.' These courts view the
insurer's duty as arising from the nature of the relationship between
1 E.g., a common form of this reservation provides that the insurer "[Mlay make
such investigation, negotiation, and settlement of any -claim or suit as it deems ex-
pedient." Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HI-Iv. L.
REV. 1136, 1137 (1954).
2 See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955).
3 Evans, The Practical Handling by Defense Counsel of Lawsuits in Excess of
Policy Limits, 1960 INs. L.J. 565, 566.
4 Appleman, Circumstances Creating Excess Liability, 1960 INs. L.J. 553.
"The insurance company, of course, being in the business, plays the law of
averages. The policyholder who is in court perhaps for the only time in his life cannot
afford to concern himself with 'averages.' There is no averaging so far as he is
concerned-this is his lawsuit. It may be the only time he will ever be in court and
he is definitely concerned about what his risk of personal loss may be. He cannot
afford to gamble, even if the company can. If his policy limits were high, then he
could relax-but usually the company would then be quick to settle to avoid the risk
of greater loss. This being true, the use of 'averages' would tend to indicate that the
insurer is, to some extent, willing to permit the risk of loss to fall upon the insured."
Id. at 554.
5 Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L.
REv. 1136, 1138 (1954).
6 J. APPLEMANN, INsURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE, §§ 4711-12 (1962); Keeton,
supra note 5 at 1138 n.5.
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insured and insurer. The minority of the jurisdictions recognizing
the cause of action hold that the insurer's liability arises out of the
"implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" which is found in
every contract.7
Superimposed on these differing theories of liability is a dis-
agreement as to the standard of care imposed on the insurer. A
majority of jurisdictions hold that the insurer is required to exercise
good faith toward the insured's interests.' The minority view is that
the insurer must act as the reasonable prudent businessman would
act in considering the interests of the insured. The majority stan-
dard of care is often called the "bad faith test," whereas the minority
standard is called the "negligence test."9
The above diversities of approach are evidenced in the devel-
opment of excess liability law in California. This comment will
explore the problems which result from the confusing nature of
California's excess liability law and will suggest a solution.
EXCESS LIABILITY IN CALIFORNIA
The Theory of Liability
In Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co.,10 the court surveyed the various
theories of liability upon which a cause of action for failure to settle
could be predicated.
The solution may be sought in the terms of the policy itself, and
the court may attempt to resort to contract law. Or the insurer may be
viewed as a fiduciary, possibly as an agent, and thereupon the court will
employ the principles of law which govern an agent's relationship to
his principal. In such situations the law generally demands good faith.
Or the courts may turn to tort law and hold that the insurer in dealing
with the defense, including the matter of settlements, must exercise
due care."
Relying on a Wisconsin decision,' s the court decided that the
cause of action stems from the clause in the insurance contract
granting the absolute power of settlement to the insurance corn-
7 1967 Wis. L. REV. 483, 491; see UNIFORM CO -MERCIAL CODE § 1-203.
8 Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 171, 178 (1955). This annotation sets forth the various
states accepting either the bad faith or negligence test and provides examples of the
various factual circumstances which have been held to constitute an insurer's bad
faith or negligence.
9 Id.
10 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 62 (1957).
11 Id. at 683, 319 P.2d at 71. The court quoted Georgia Life Ins. Co. v. Mississippi
Cent. R. Co., 116 Miss. 114, 76 So. 646 (1917).
12 Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 235 N.W. 413 (1931).
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pany.'3 The insurer's power to accept or reject settlement offers
was held to create an implied contract between the insurer and the
insured whereby the insurance company agreed to act in good faith
toward the insured's interests. 4
Although Brown spoke of an implied contract between the
insured and insurer, the court, in the course of discussing the assign-
ability of the cause of action, stated that the insured's cause of action
was assignable even if it did arise out of tort. 5 The Brown decision,
therefore, seems to imply that the cause of action for failure to
settle sounds in contract and in tort.
A year later, the California Supreme Court affirmed Brown in
Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co. 6 and stated that the
cause of action could be assigned regardless of whether the action
sounded in tort or contract.' 7 Comunale recognized that a wrongful
refusal to settle has generally been treated as a tort, but stated that
when a case sounds both in contract and tort the insured will have
an election between the two actions.' 8
Comunale apparently did not eliminate all confusion as to
whether the theory of the cause of action is based on contract, tort,
or both. The district court of appeal in Critz v. Farmers Ins.
Group'9 (decided six years after Comunale) stated:
Prior to the Comunale decision, it was not clear whether the policy-
holder's claim against the insurer sounded in tort or contract. In
California at least, the Comunale decision established breach of an
implied covenant . . . as the theoretical basis of the claim.20
The most recent case on excess liability is Crisci v. Security Ins.
Co." In Crisci the Supreme Court of California unanimously dis-
approved of the above language in Critz, approved of Comunale as
to the insured's right of election between tort and contract, and
13 Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 684, 319 P.2d 62, 72 (1957).
14 Id. at 684, 319 P.2d at 72. The court cited Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co.,
204 Wis. 1, 12, 235 N.W. 413, 414-15 (1931).
15 Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 693, 319 P.2d 62, 79 (1957).
The court pointed to CAL. CIV. CODE § 954 stating that the tort cause of action
"[A]rises 'out of the violation of a right of property' . . . and is expressly made
assignable . .. ."
16 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
17 Id. at 661, 328 P.2d at 202. The Comunale case is unique in that the insurer
was found liable not only for its failure to defend but also for its failure to settle.
18 Id. at 663, 328 P.2d at 203. The court cited Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal. 2d 807,
811, 249 P.2d 257, 260 (1952), as authority for plaintiff's election of an action in tort or
contract.
19 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1964).
20 Id. at 799, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
21 66 A.C. 435, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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stated that the breach of the implied covenant also constitutes a
tort 2
That the cause of action for failure to settle sounds both in
tort and contract has far reaching consequences. For example, the
theory of liability pursued may be highly significant in determining
which statute of limitations applies to the cause of action. If, in
Comunale, the court had not permitted an election, the assignee of
the insured's cause of action would have been barred by the tort
statute of limitations?
Similarly, the theory of liability elected in the Crisci case was
of paramount importance. The district court of appeals found that
in actions against the insurer for failure to settle, tort damages for
mental suffering could not be awarded because "[I] n California we
treat such actions as sounding in contract. ' 24 The supreme court,
however, upheld the trial court's precedent-setting $25,000 award
for mental suffering, citing a previous California Supreme Court
decision, Eads v. Marks.
25
In Eads the court stated:
A tort may grow out of or be coincident with a contract, and the
existence of a contractual relationship does not immunize a tort feasor
from tort liability for his wrongful acts in breach of the contract. 20
Crisci, therefore, appears to finally settle the confusion as to
whether the cause of action for failure to settle is based upon a
theory of contract or tort-it is based upon both. That the insured
or his assignee is now allowed complete freedom of election neces-
sarily expands the insurer's liability.
Measuring the Insurer's Duty
The confusion in California surrounding the duty the insurer
owes its insured in settlement negotiations has not been eliminated.
The decisions from Brown to Crisci have developed an amorphous
standard of good faith-reasonableness to measure the insurer's duty.
22 Id. at 443, 445, 426 P.2d at 178-79, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19.
23 Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 662-63, 328 P.2d
198, 203 (1958).
24 Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 243 A.C.A. 341, -, 52 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291 (1966).
The District Court of Appeals relied on the quoted excerpt from the Critz opinion.
25 Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal. 2d 807, 249 P.2d 257 (1952). Crisci as well as
Comunale relied on the Eads decision.
26 Id. at 811, 249 P.2d at 260. The court explained, "[T]hat if the cause of
action arises from a breach of promise set forth in the contract, the action is ex
contractu, but if it arises from a breach of duty growing out of the contract it is ex
delicto." Id. at 811, 249 P.2d at 260.
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As stated above, the Brown decision held that the insurer, as
a result of an implied contract, owes a duty of good faith toward the
interests of its insured.27 California, therefore (at least in theory),
accepted the bad faith test recognized in the majority of jurisdic-
tions: "[S]ubstantial culpability ...bad faith rather than mere
negligence." 8 Brown set forth various factors to be considered in
determining whether the insurer reached its duty of good faith.
[T]he strength of the injured claimant's case on the issues of
liability and damage; attempts by the insurer to induce the insured to
contribute to a settlement; failure of the insurer to properly investigate
the circumstances so as to ascertain the evidence against the insured;
the insurer's rejection of advice of its own attorney or agent; failure
of the insurer to inform the insured of a compromise offer; the amount
of financial risk to which each party is exposed in the event of a refusal
to settle; the fault of the insured in inducing the insurer's rejection of
the compromise offer by misleading it as to the facts; and any other
factors tending to establish or negate bad faith on the part of the
insurer. 29
The foregoing factors used in determining bad faith are diffi-
cult to distinguish from negligence. One writer has said, "[T]his
importance of basing liability on bad faith rather than negligence is
winked at by our courts. 3 °
In Comunale the court held that an insurer is liable for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith when it refuses to accept a
reasonable settlement within the policy limits.3"
The insurer, in deciding whether a claim should be compromised,
must take into account the interest of the insured and give it at least
as much consideration as it does to its own interests .... When there is
great risk of a recovery beyond the policy limits so that the most
reasonable manner of disposing of the claim is a settlement which can
be made within those limits, a consideration in good faith of the in-
sured's interest requires the insurer to settle the claim. Its unwarranted
refusal to do so constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.32 (emphasis added)
Comunale has been criticized because, while the court spoke in
terms of bad faith, it was in reality, by referring to a "reasonable
27 Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 684, 319 P.2d 62, 72
(1957).
28 Id. at 688, 319 P.2d at 74.
29 Id. at 689, 319 P.2d at 75. For a list of additional factors the California
courts have held to evidence bad faith see 18 STAN. L. REV. 475, 478 (1966).
30 Jarrett, Lawsuits for Wrongful Refusal to Defend or to Settle, 28 INs. CoUNsEL.
J. 58, 61 (1961).
31 Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 661, 328 P.2d
198, 201, 202 (1958).
32 Id. at 659, 328 P.2d at 201.
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manner," applying a test of negligence." Similarly, the decision of
Davy v. Public Nat'l Ins. Co. 4 has been often criticized for stating,
"[U]nreasonable rejection of an offer of compromise constitutes
bad faith. .... 
Nonetheless, the Crisci opinion embraces the language quoted
above. Crisci states that the implied obligation of good faith and
fair dealing requires the insurer to settle "when appropriate."36 The
insurer must give at least equal consideration to the interests of its
insured.17 The test of whether the insured's interests were given at
least equal consideration is "[W]hether a prudent insurer . . .
would have accepted the settlement offer."38
The good faith-reasonableness test has the effect of increasing
the insurer's duty. While placing a heavier duty on the insurer may
be desirable, the use of the good faith-reasonableness test creates
unnecessary confusion and hardship.
Resulting Problems and Hardships
It is undisputed that good faith is a subjective test of an indi-
vidual's state of mind, whereas negligence is an objective test mea-
sured by the reasonable prudent man standard. 9 Aside from the
apparent judicial inclination to increase the insurer's duty, the
courts may have interjected an objective standard of reasonableness
because of the evidentiary difficulty in finding subjective bad faith.
However, measuring the insurer's duty by an objective standard also
presents difficulties:
Just as the trier of fact cannot see into the mind or soul of a
corporation, it encounters prohibitive difficulty in isolating the care of
the reasonably prudent insurance company .... 40
A California jury trying to apply a mixed good faith-reasonableness
test is faced with a doubly confusing and unsatisfactory standard.
The present standard of good faith-reasonableness also confuses
the insurer trying to plan its future conduct. Aside from case-by-case
factual determination as to what constitutes bad faith, the insurance
company attempting to meet its duty of settlement has no concrete
33 Jarrett, supra note 30 at 60.
34 181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1960).
35 Id. at 395, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 492 (emphasis added).
36 Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 A.C. 435, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
37 Id. at 440, 443, 426 P.2d at 176, 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16, 18.
38 Id. at 440, 426 P.2d at 176, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 16 (emphasis added).
39 Roos, A Note on the Excess Problem, 26 CAL. ST. B.J. 355, 357 (1951).
40 Brief for Edward L. Lascher as Amicus Curiae at 10, Crisci v. Security Ins. Co.,
60 A.C. 435, 425 P.2d 173 (1967).
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guidelines. The insurer can only speculate as to what new factual
circumstances a court will consider in determining whether there
has been a breach of duty. As a result of these peculiarly speculative
guidelines, the insurer is faced with a dilemma. It must choose
between a settlement which may be unnecessarily large and a course
of litigation which may be unpredictably hazardous. If the insurer
chooses to defend, and the plaintiff prevails in his action against the
insured, the loss is compounded by the cost of the ensuing excess
liability action.
Thus, under the existing law, the insurer feels insecure when-
ever it refuses to settle even though it believes it has acted within
the limits of the good faith-reasonableness test. Therefore, through-
out the investigation of the initial claim, the insurer and its attorney
are tempted to build an elaborate facade of reasonableness in antici-
pation of an excess liability action. "The attentions of insured, com-
pany, and their attorneys are diverted from defense against the
tort claim of claimant to jockeying with each other for favorable
positions with respect to the potential claim for excess liability.'
As a practical matter, the insurance company's efforts to protect
itself in settlement negotiations are often of little avail if a judg-
ment is rendered in excess of policy limits. Even though the insurer
might have made an honest mistake it will be hard-pressed to explain
why the trial court found that the claimant was entitled to damages
in excess of the policy limits.42 Similarly, the insurer will have diffi-
culty explaining to the jury in the excess liability action why its
experienced claims adjusters miscalculated the extent of damages.
When these explanatory difficulties are coupled with the prob-
lem of overcoming a jury's inherent tendency to be prejudiced
against an insurer, the task of justifying a failure to settle becomes
nearly impossible. Juries have been criticized as being prone to
exercise the "deep pocket" theory when dealing with insurers.48
Even if the jury in the excess liability suit is not inherently
prejudiced against the insurer, it is quite probable that they will
be sympathetic toward the insured. The average jury will include
a number of policyholders who will sympathize with the plight of
the insured.44
41 Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HAtv. L.
REv. 1136, 1183 (1954). See also Evans, The Practical Handling by Defense Counsel
of Lawsuits in Excess of Policy Limits, 1960 INs. L.J. 565; Jarrett, Lawsuits for
Wrongful Refusal to Defend or to Settle, 28 INs. CoUNsEL J. 58 (1961).
42 Comment, Liability of An Insurer For Failure to Seetle Claims, 6 U.C.L.A. L.
Rav. 124, 134 (1959).
43 18 STAN. L. Rav. 475, 480 (1966).
44 Id. at 480. The author also points out that the insurance companies' chances of
1967]
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It is apparent, considering the above-mentioned inferences and
prejudices, that an insurance company facing an excess liability
action will find itself in a position approaching strict liability.
STRICT LIABILITY-A DESIRED SOLUTION
It has been suggested that a solution to excess liability problems
would be to hold the insurer strictly liable for the excess judgment
which resulted from the insurer's rejection of a claimant's offer to
settle within policy limits. 5 However, the commentators who have
lauded the benefits of strict liability as a solution, have usually con-
cluded on a pessimistic note by saying that strict liability will prob-
ably not prevail because of judicial precedent to the contrary."
Although the court in Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. did not decide
the case on strict liability,47 it did expound the benefits of the
imposition of a rule of strict liability as suggested by amicus
curiae.48 Basically, the rule would be that an insurer is strictly liable
for the amount of any final judgment in excess of the policy limits
whenever such insurer rejects a firm offer to settle within the policy
limits.4"
The court pointed out that it is not uncommon for an insured
to expect that, in case of a claim against him, the insurer will make
available a sum of money equal to the policy limits." The court
stated:
In view of such expectation an insurer should not be permitted to
further its own interests by rejecting opportunities to settle within the
policy limits unless it is also willing to absorb losses which may result
from its failure to settle.
[T]here is more than a small amount of elementary justice in a
obtaining reversal of an excess liability verdict are slim. "Of the eleven appellate cases
in California, the insurer has lost ten, and the authority for the remaining one is
doubtful." Id. at 480.
45 Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 172-73 (1955); Comment, 48 MIcH. L. REV. 95, 102
(1949) ; 18 STAN. L. REV. 475, 482-85 (1966); 13 U. CHi. L. REV. 105, 109 (1945)
60 YALE L.J. 1037, 1041-42 (1951).
46 See secondary authorities cited note 45 supra.
47 Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 A.C. 435, 441-42, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 17 (1967). After noting the beneficial aspects of strict liability the court
stated, "Wle need not, however, here determine whether there might be some
countervailing considerations precluding adoption of the proposed rule because . . . the
evidence is clearly sufficient to support the determination that Security breached its
duty .... " Id. at 442, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
48 Brief for Edward L. Lascher as Amicus Curiae, Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66
A.C. 435, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
49 Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 A.C. 435, 441, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 17 (1967).
50 Id.
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rule that would recognize that, in this situation where the insurer's and
the insured's interests necessarily conflict, the insurer, which may reap
the benefits of its determination not to settle, should also suffer the
detriments of its decision.51
Similarly, it is only fair that a policyholder who has paid for
a stated amount of protection should not shoulder the risk of an
excess judgment when the insurance company, by accepting a
settlement offer, can provide protection within the policy limits.5 2
Strict liability would place the risk of an excess judgment on the
insurer if such insurer insisted on litigating the claim.
That the insurer shoulders the risk does not necessarily mean
that it will be forced to settle sham claims or be forced to accept an
unreasonably high settlement offer. The insurer will still fight these
suits and, if correct in assuming the suit was a sham or the settle-
ment offer was unreasonable, the verdict will probably be for the
defendant, or damages will at least be within policy limits. As
pointed out by amicus curiae in Crisci:
There will be cases in which there will be surprise, but the very
efficiency and knowledge of the insurance industry is the best guarantee
that those will be minor in number.
If that were not true, and judgments in excess of the policy limits
following a refusal to settle will be the rule-rather than the rare ex-
ception-then what sort of light does that cast upon insurance com-
panies? To say that is to say that bad faith is the rule, or negligence,
or breach of implied covenant of fairness, or what-have-you. 53
The court in Crisci was well aware that insurance companies
sometimes play the law of averages and go to trial gambling on a
verdict for the defense.
The proposed rule would also eliminate the danger that an in-
surer, faced with a settlement offer at or near the policy limits, will
reject it and gamble with the insured's money to further its own in-
terests.
5 4
Under a rule of strict liability, if an insurer wished to gamble it
would be free to do so but would be absolutely liable for any
resulting judgment for the claimant.
The California Supreme Court recognizes that there are strong
inferences and prejudices against an insurer.55 As previously noted,
51 Id. at 441-42, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
52 60 YALE L.J. 1037, 1041 (1951).
53 Brief for Edward L. Lascher as Amicus Curiae at 20-21, Crisci v. Security Ins.
Co., 66 A.C. 435, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
54 Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 A.C. 435, 441-42, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 17 (1967).
55 Id. at 442, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
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a jury trying an excess judgment case would probably find these
inferences conclusive. Therefore, a rule of strict liability would not
necessarily be a disastrous blow to the insurance industry, for in
the great majority of cases the insurer will continue to be found
liable in excess judgment actions, regardless of whether a rule of
strict liability is applied or the amorphous good faith-reasonableness
test is followed.
Perhaps the prime practical advantage to be gained from a
rule of strict liability is that it would substitute a consistent, pre-
dictable method of determining liability. Crisci recognized this
advantage of a rule of strict liability. "The proposed rule is a simple
one to apply and avoids the burdens of a determination of whether
a settlement offer within the policy limits was reasonable." 56
If the solution of strict liability were adopted, the insurer,
insured, and the claimant, who is the potential assignee of the in-
sured's excess liability action, would not feel compelled to prolong
settlement negotiations because there would be no need to jockey
for favorable positions in contemplation of an excess liability ac-
tion.17 It is evident that, if an insurance company clearly realizes
that it bears the risk of an excess judgment, it will either settle
promptly or litigate.
It is possible that the insurance industry would save money if
a rule of strict liability were imposed. If the insurer settled, it would
save the cost of defense and extensive investigation.5 8 If it chose
to litigate, and suffered an excess judgment, it would pay and save
the expense of defending an excess liability action."9
Even without considering the insurer's litigation expenses it
is doubtful, "[W]hether the cost of making reasonable settlements
in the majority of cases would largely exceed the cost of meeting
the occasional excess judgment for which the insurer is now held
liable."'6 Also, if the rule of strict liability did increase the insurer's
56 Id. at 441, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
57 See authorities cited at note 41 supra.
58 Brief for Edward L. Lascher as Amicus Curiae at 16, Crisci v. Security Ins.
Co., 66 A.C. 435, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). "The case at bar is a vivid
example . . . [W]ith a $10,000 policy, the company could have settled for $9,000 of
which the insured would have contributed $2,500, for a net expense to the company
of $6,500. Instead, it spent some $18,000 on defense of the initial action and probably
not much less in defending the present action." Id. at 16.
59 Id. at 13-14. "Under a rule of strict liability there would be scant reason for
trial of the second action, except for the predictably rare case in which fraud or the
like were present. . . . [Ilnsurance companies are not managed by fools, and there
is no point in defending a case which cannot be won .... " Id. at 14.
60 Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 173 n.8 (1955).
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costs, the insurance industry would be in a unique position to dis-
tribute losses to its policyholders. 61
It is submitted that the benefits of a rule of strict liability are
apparent and outweigh the possible objections. In light of the Crisci
decision it is not overly optimistic to predict that a court-adopted
rule of strict liability is forthcoming. 2
Victor D. Vertner
61 Id. at 173 n.8. The annotation suggests that even if policy costs are increased,
"[T]his is not necessarily objectionable if the basic social aim of spreading losses by
means of insurance is furthered." Id. at 173 n.8. And see 18 STAN. L. REv. 475, 484-85
(1966), which states that the strict liability rule would not only save the insured from
having to endure mental suffering as a result of an excess judgment, but would also
save the insurer money by not having to pay general damages.
62 10 AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS NEWS LETTER, No. 4 at 125 (1967). This news
letter notes the Crisci decision, and predicts that courts will adopt a rule of strict
liability.
"We believe that a careful reading of the instant splendid and far reaching opinion
supports the view that in a proper case the California Supreme Court will have no
inhibitions against imposing a strict liability upon carriers who, pursuing a calculus
of self-interest, abandon their insureds to the improvidence of chance." Id. at 125.
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